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Toward the formation of
11
INNOCENCE
COMMISSIONS''
in America
By Barry C. Scheck
and Peter J. Neufeld
By monitoring and
investigating errors
in the criminal justice
system, innocence
commissions could help
remedy systemic defects
that bring about
wrongful convictions.

I

n the United States there are
strict and immediate investigative measures taken when an airplane falls from the sky, a plane's fuel
tank explodes on a runway, or a train
derails. Serious inquiries are swiftly
made by the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB), an agency with
subpoena power, great expertise, and
real independence to answer the important and obvious questions: What
went wrong? Was it system error or an
individual's mistake? Was there any
official misconduct? And, most important of all , what can be done to
correct the problem and prevent it
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from happening again? Indeed, since
the primary purpose of the NTSB is
to protect the public safety, it will
sometimes issue safety recommenda-
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tions before its investigation of a
crash is complete, recommendations
identifying problems that may not
even turn out to be the ultimate
cause of the crash.
The American criminal justice system, in sharp contrast, has no institutional mechanism to evaluate its
equivalent of a catastrophic plane
crash, the conviction of an innocent
person. In fact, an emphasis on finality and procedural due process in our
post-conviction procedures has for
too long obscured both the frequency and implications of wrongful
convictions. This point is vividly illustrated by the 110 post-conviction
DNA exonerations that have occurred in the United States in the 10
years preceding September 1, 2002. 1
Although these cases all involve convictions on serious felony charges
that were affirmed on direct appeal,
and often upheld after post-conviction proceedings in both state and
federal courts, there has never been a
I . A running list and description of post-convictio n DNA exon e ration s compiled by the Innoce n ce Proj ec t is ava il a ble at h!!.Jl;.LL
innocen ceprojec t. or~.

2. E.g. see Bailey, DNA Clears Man jailed 22 Years,
But DoM Still Shut, The Commercial Appeal , May
3, 2002, at Al, where District Attorney General Bill
Gibbons, commenting on the exoneration of
Clark McMillan, a man wrongly convicted of rape
and robbery and who seived 22 years in jail, longer
than any other exoneree, before DNA evidence
proved he was innocent, said "I think it shows our
system works." See also Marshall, Do exonerations
prove that "the system works?"in this issue (page 83) .
3. It has been suggested by colleagues that the
term "innocence commission" is both "too narrow" because the reforms expected to emerge
from such bodies would not just protect the innocent but also lead to the apprehension of the
guilty, and politically undesirable as the phrase
"innocence commission" would be seen as a term
favorable to the criminal defense movement. See
Findley, Learning.from Our Mistakes: A Criminal justice Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38
CAL. W. L. REv. 333,353 (Spring 2002). This point
may be correct. We have always wanted "innocence commissions" to be understood as organizations dedicated to a public safety imperative, generating findings that would be perceived as just,
good law enforcement. The political process will
ultimate ly determine whether the term "innocence" is loaded and identified as a criminal defense code word. We like the term because it goes
to the heart of what the average citizen expects of
the criminal justice system "to protect the innocent, apprehend the guilty, and correct mistakes
when the innocent are wrongly convicted. "
4. The Innocence Project's list of post-conviction DNA exonerations is composed entirely of
such "officially acknowledged" wrongful convictions. A DNA exoneration is defined as any case
where a conviction was vacated on the grounds of
new evidence of innocence from DNA testing
and the indictment was dismissed without subsequent prosecution , the defendant was pardoned
by a gove rnor, or the defendant was acquitted after trial.

Like the National Transportation Safety Board, which
investigates aircraft, railroad, and other accidents and
issues recommendations, innocence commissions could
review the causes of any officially acknowledged case of
wrongful conviction and recommend remedies to prevent
such miscarriages of justice from happening again.

detailed opinion written about what
went wrong in any of these cases,
much less an analysis offering suggestions on what could be done to prevent similar miscarriages of justice.
Instead, the exculpatory DNA results are received, an order vacating
the conviction ( or a gubernatorial
pardon) is issued, and, in a few cases,
the judge or the governor offers an
apology. To confound matters further, many, but by no means all, of
the public officials who should be
most concerned about the underlying causes of such wrongful convictions blithely proclaim that the "system has worked" and assiduously
avoid the suggestion there is anything further to investigate.2 Those
officials who want to get to the root of
these problems do not have an independent body to which they can turn
for further investigation or policy
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recommendations.
In order to address effectively underlying, institutional problems that
contribute to the conviction of innocent persons, we propose the creation of "innocence commissions" 3
to investigate and monitor errors in
the criminal justice system just as the
NTSB investigates and monitors airplane and other major transportation accidents in the United States.
Simply put, innocence commissions
should be automatically assigned to
review the causes of any officially acknowledged case of wrongful conviction,4 whether the conviction was reversed with post-conviction DNA tests
or through some other new evidence
of innocence, and recommend remedies to prevent such miscarriages of
justice from happening again.
There is no one best way to create
state or federal level innocence com-
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Fortunately, we are not writing on a
blank slate. In Canada and Great
Britain there are two distinctly different kinds of institutions that address
the problem of wrongful convictions
that could serve as good working
models.
The Canadian "Public Inquiries"
model. Canadian "Public Inquiries,"
also known as Royal Commissions or

Commissions oflnquiry, were first es- · and Northern Ireland. "7 By most actablished more than 150 years ago as counts, since its establishment in
a way for sovereignties to conduct in- January 1997, the CCRC has evolved
dependent, non-government-affili- into an admirably effective and subated investigations regarding the stantial governmental agency. 8 If, after
conduct of public businesses or the going through its four-stage process of
fair administration of justice.5 Each screening and investigation, it finds a
province and the federal Canadian "real possibility" ofan "unsafe" convicgovernment has passed legislation tion or an unjust sentence, the CCRC
enabling the establishment of these can refer the case back to the appelindependent public inquiries. Based late courts for further action, or make
on a direction from the executive a recommendation for a Royal parbranch, a public inquiry can be don. While the CCRC does on occa"chartered" to have designated per- sion discuss the causes of wrongful
sons (frequently judges) investigate convictions and remedies, such analyalmost any issue of public concern. sis has not been its principal mission,
Canadian Public Inquiries have inves- as the work of the CCRC occurs before,
tigated a wide-range of issues includ- not after, an official acknowledgment
ing contaminated blood supplies in by the courts that a wrongful convicthe nation's hospitals and the status tion has occurred.
The CCRC has a I 4-member board
of women.
Recently, however, separate public of distinguished citizens; two thirds
inquiries were conducted in the wake are lay persons, one third are lawyers,
of two celebrated post-conviction and one third must have some sort of
DNA exonerations, Guy Paul Morin criminal justice expertise. The majorand Thomas Sophonow, producing ity of investigations are handled by
comprehensive reports that both re- the CCRC itself and its staff. Where a
viewed the specific circumstances of case calls for specialized knowledge,
each case and issued findings regard- the CCRC may hire an expert to exing systemic practices "that may have amine the evidence and issue a recontributed to or influenced the port. The CCRC has the authority to
course of the investigation or pros- inspect and order the preservation of
ecution. " 6 The designated leaders of all materials held by a public body. It
the Morin and Sophonow Public In- does not have a similar mandate for
quiries had subpoena power, held materials in the possession of private
hearings, recruited, when necessary, organizations or individuals, nor
government laboratories or indepen- does it have the power to carry out
dent experts, and issued reports that searches, check criminal records, or
dealt with the specific causes of these make an arrest, but it can appoint an
wrongful convictions and made investigating officer, such as a police
policy recommendations about rem- officer, who does have such powers,
edies to prevent wrongful convictions to work on the CCRC's behalf.
An investigation is not considered
in the future.
With some significant modifica- complete until the CCRC shares its
tions, and drawing heavily upon the findings with applicants and offers
American experience with the NTSB,
we believe the Morin and Sophonow
inquiries represent a good model to
5. Sellar, A Century of Commissions of Inquiry, 25
BAR REv. 1, 1 (1947).
track when designing innocence CANADIAN
6. See, "Tho mas Sophonow Inquiry Report, "
commissions in the U. S.
Province of Manitoba. Report available at: h!m;L
/www.gov. mb .ca/ justice/so phonow/ toc.html.;
The British Criminal Case Review and
"Report of the Commission On Proceedings
Commission model. The Criminal Involving Guy Paul Morin " Report available at:
.attorneyg e n era l .j u s. gov .on .ca/
Case Review Commission (CCRC) of http://www
html/MORIN / morin.htm .
Great Britain is, according to its own
7. See, http://www.ccrc.gov. uk/.
8. See, Findley, supra n. 3, at 7-9; Horan, The Indescription, "an independent, open, nocence
Commission: An Independent Review Board
thorough, impartial and accountable for Wrongful Convictions, 20 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 91
(2000); Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convicbody investigating suspected miscar- tions:
A Comparative Perspective, 16 AM. U. I NT' L L.
riages of justice in England, Wales, REv. 1241 (2001).
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missions. One can easily env1s10n
such a commission being formed
through legislative enactment, executive order, or appointment by the
chief judicial officer of a state. Even
the formation of an interdisciplinary
group by a non-profit organization,
or a state university system, could be
the vehicle for an innocence commission as long as that entity is delegated
appropriate legal authority and resources to conduct fact-based investigations. These entities must not
merely be "study commissions" offering policy recommendations, but investigative agencies whose findings
arise from direct review of actual
cases.
Thus, the key, necessary features of
an innocence commission will be
subpoena power, access to first- rate
investigative resources, and political
independence. Like the NTSB, an institution whose example is well worth
emulating, these commissions must
be trusted to speak out continually
about cases where the system fails,
without fear or favor, even if their recommendations are, for a while , ignored by political, law enforcement,
or judicial bodies.
What follows is an effort to explain
why innocence commissions can
serve as a capstone reform that keeps
in place a recurring systemic examination of defects and remedies in the
criminal justice system before the
current "learning moment" brought
about by post-conviction DNA exonerations fades. This discussion is intended to offer practical suggestions
on what the organizing principles of
such commissions should be, taking
into account the political realities of
criminal justice reform in the United
States.

Canadian and British models

The Royal Courts of Justice, London. The British Criminal Case Review
Commission investigates suspected miscarriages of Justice In England,
Wales, and Northern Ireland.

ies charged with exposing the root
causes of wrongful convictions that
have already been established as miscarriages of justice, will be a better
first step in building an effective reform movement to redress basic flaws
in the American criminal justice system. Ultimately, as public understanding grows about the prevalence
of wrongful convictions, institutions
based on the CCRC model will be
created. The CCRC, after all , was
formed as a result of public outcry
over revelations from public inquiry
investigations into the notorious
wrongful convictions of IRA defendants in the Birmingham Six and
Guilford Four cases. 11

A "learning moment"

them a chance to comment on the
investigation . Once an investigation
is comple ted , the CCRC decides
whether to recommend the case for
appeal. This decision must be m ade
by a t least three bo a rd members.
Since 1997, the CCRC has received
3,680 applications , 2,381 of which
have been reviewed as of October 31,
2000 . Of those , 203 have been referred . Among the referrals, 49 have
bee n heard and 38 of those (77.5 percent of refe rrals, 1.6 percent of the
original completed applications) resulted in quashed convictions.9 If a
decision for referral is made , it is up
to the applicants and their legal representative to make their case in appellate court. If an application is not
9. Griffin , supra n . 8, a t 1277.
I 0. A running li st of innoce nce p roj ec ts wo rking within the "innocence n e two rk" can be found
at
h ttp :// inn oce n ce p ro jec t. o rg /a b o u t /
o the r p rojects.php.
11. The "Guilford Four" case involved the dismissal of charges again st suspected IRA membe rs
wh en eviden ce was foun d conclusive ly provin g
tha t th e po lice h ad fabri cate d th e d efe ndants
supposed confessions. In the "Bi rmin gh am Six "
case, the court overturn ed IRA convictio n s based
on defendan ts ' confessio ns whe n it was revealed
that the supposed confessio ns h ad been drafted
by the police after the fac t. See Griffi n , supra n . 8,
a l 1248.
12. A running list, text, a nd an alysis of postconvi ctio n DNA statutes, as well as the Innoce nce
Protection Act, a bi-partisan bill in Congress th at
would mandate post-convictio n DNA testing in
e very st a te, is avai la bl e a t h.!!Jl.;L.l
innocen ceproject.org.
13. Uni ted States v. Quinones, et al, No. S3 00 Cr.
761 USR) Uuly I , 2002) .

referred to an appea ls court, the applicant may apply again if new evidence or arguments appear in the future.
Notwithstanding the remarkable
progress made by the CCRC in just
five years, it is not the model we envision for "innocence commissions."
This is certa inly not because the
United States has no need for institutions like the CCRC to pursue postconviction claims of innocence. On
the contrary, compared to the network of comparatively small and resource-starved innocence projects
that have been formed at law schools,
journalism schools, and public defender offices throughout the United
States, which endeavor to exonerate
the factually innocent, 10 the CCRC is
an impressively efficient, powerful ,
and superior institution.
Rather, our reluctance to advocate
this model arises from practical and
political concerns. Proposals based
on a CCRC model could be too easily,
albeit unfairly, attacked as requiring
large government bureaucracies
based on un-American notions of an
inquisitional justice system that
would squander precious law enforcement funds on prisoners making frivolous claims. On the other
hand , following the example of the
NTSB and Canadian Public Inquiries, proposals for smaller public bod-

Courts, scholars, and policy makers
are all beginning to recognize that
the most important aspect of the
wave of post-conviction DNA exonerations is what it can teach us about
all the other cases (the vast majority)
where DNA testing is not available.
This wave of exonerations has probably not crested. As states pass postconviction DNA statutes (there are
now 27), 12 providing inmates an opportunity to prove their innocence,
exonerations have and will continue
to increase. But it would be shortsighted not to assume the wave of
DNA exonerations will eventually
pass and foolish not to capitalize on
what is plainly a "learning moment. "
Most recently, a United States District Court judge, Jed Rakoff, citing
the serious doubts regarding the reliability of guilt or innocence findings
in non-DNA cases raised by post-conviction DNA testing, actually found
the federal death penalty an unconstitutional violation of due process. 13
While some have derided the decision as "eccentric" and unlikely to be
sustained by appellate courts, those
commentators generally acknowledge the factual premise of Judge
Rakoff's argument and agree that
post-conviction exonerations in capital and non-capital cases, primarily
through DNA testing, strongly
"suggest[s] that the number of false
convictions is higher than previously
understood ," which creates a need to
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address the "innocence" issue directly.
Empirical study by scholars of the
wrongful convictions uncovered in
the past decade has begun with renewed seriousness. 14 The case study
approach for analyzing wrongful
convictions laid out in 1932 by Professor Edward Borchard in his classic
work, Convicting the Innocent: Sixty-five
Actual Errors of Criminal Justice, and
powerfully supplemented by Hugo
Bedeau and Michael Radelet's research regarding capital cases 52
years later, 15 will surely be followed by
more statistically sophisticated analyses similar to those employed by Professors James Liebman and Jeffrey
Fagan and their colleagues in studies
examining reversals in death penalty
cases. 16 As the pool of documented
wrongful convictions rapidly grows,
deconstructing the underlying patterns will become increasingly possible, and academics from many disciplines will certainly take advantage
of this "learning moment."
Policy makers have also responded
to the issue of convicting the innocent with a series of "study" commissions that have focused on wrongful
convictions in capital cases and reform in the administration of the
death penalty. Reports from commissions in Nebraska, Indiana, Virginia,
Maryland, Arizona, and Illinois have
either been produced or are due
soon. 17
The Report of the Governor's
Commission on Capital Punishment,
a study requested by Governor
George Ryan after he declared a
moratorium on the death penalty in
Illinois is by far the most impressive
for its content and transparency. The
Ryan Commission "carefully scrutinized" all 13 death row exonerations
in Illinois, studied every reported decision in a pending capital case, held
public and private hearings, consulted with nationally recognized experts, and commissioned their own
empirical study of capital sentencing.
In terms of our definition, as opposed to other study commissions,
the Ryan Commission functioned as
a true innocence commission because it derived its findings directly

14. The first survey study of post-conviction
DNA exonerations can be found in Sheck,
Neufeld. and Dwyer, Appendix 2: DNA Exonerations at a Glance, in ACTUAL INNOCENCE, first and
second editions, (2000, 2001) ..
15. Bedeau and Radelet, Miscarriage ofjustice in
Poten tially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV . 21
(I 987); Rade let and Bedeau, IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES
(1992).
16. Liebman and Fagan, et al , "A Broke n System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995,"
available at http://www.justice.policy.net/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml?id=l8200; and "A
Broken System, Part II: Why There is So Much
Error in Capital Cases and What Can be Done
About
It ,"
available
at
h.!.m.d.L
www. justice. policy.net/ cj reform/ dps tudy/
study/index.vtml.
17. When Republican Governor of Illinois Ryan
declared a moratorium on the death penalty, he
also appointed a blue ribbon committee to examine the causes behind and offer reforms to prevent wrongful convictions. That report was released in the spring of 2002 and is available at:
http://www.idoc. state .ii. us/ ccp / ccp / reports/
commission reports .html. While a proposed
moratorium on the death penalty in Nebraska
failed, an extensive state-sponsored study released
in 2001 of the administration of that state's death
penalty found that economic and geographic
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from the study of actual cases within" cies are not known for their flexible
the jurisdiction. Significantly, the response to complex problems. Most
Ryan Commission was strongly influ- state criminal justice systems consist
enced by the methodology and find- of elected district attorneys from difings of the Guy Paul Morin and Tho- ferent counties, some rural and some
mas Sophonow public inquiries in very urban, as well as small and large
Canada, whose reports, again, arose police departments; it is not a simple
from thorough study of two wrongful matter to get these comparatively auconvictions.
tonomous actors to engage in coUltimately, the Commission made ordinated or uniform change.
So it should not be cause for de85 detailed recommendations for reform and produced a valuable set of spair that reforms recommended by
appendices. While many of these rec- study commissions, which are mainommendations addressed problems stream, sensible, and bi-partisan,
specific to the administration of the seem to be ignored. Rather, the imcapital punishment system in Illinois, portant institutional question is how
most of the findings that related to to maintain a steady public focus on
problems associated with wrongful underlying problems and remedies
convictions, as the commission itself so the natural inclination of the poemphasized, were applicable to the litical actors and law enforcement
bureaucracies to resist them can be
entire criminal justice system. 18
Soon after the Ryan Commission overcome. Can the creation of innoReport was released in April of 2002, cence commissions consistently spotleaders of the Illinois legislature ex- light systemic defects in the criminal
pressed serious doubt about whether justice system long after the "learnmany of the 85 recommendations ing moment" of DNA exonerations
would be enacted in any form. 19 Nor ends? We think the history of the
can it be said that the Morin and NTSB provides an encouraging anSophonow public inqmnes in swer to this question.
Canada have resulted in rapid or
comprehensive reforms despite the The NTSB example
fact that the two Canadian inquiries The NTSB was created by statute in
reached similar findings. This should 1974 to "investigate ... and establish
not come as a surprise. State legisla- the facts, circumstances, and probtures and criminal justice bureaucra- able cause of' aircraft, highway, rail-

disparities were the most prevalent impedim ents
to preventing wrongful convictions and offered a
number of reforms. The study can be found at:
http: //www.nadp.inetnedr /Study Page.html.
Maryland's Governor also ordered a comprehensive two-year study of the death penalty in March
2001. Results are expected sometime in 2003. Indiana re leased its study commission findings in
December of 2001. Results of commission studies
in Virginia, and Arizon a are pending. See,
Liebman and Fagan, et al, supra n. 16, at 1.
18. Ryan Commission, at Chapter 14, General
Recommendations, and Recommendation 83.
See also Thomas Sullivan, Preventing wrongful convictions, in this issue (page 106).
19. See, McKinney, Capital Punishment &form?
Don't Bet on it this Year, Chicago Sun-Times, April
16, 2002, at 8: "Election year realities mean few
lawmakers want to cast votes to scale back capital
punishment, as the commission advises, and be
portrayed as soft on crime, post-Sept. 11. 'I don't
think this will be popular, " said Senate President
James 'Pate' Philip (R-Wood Dale), ... who said
he'd be surprised if there was any action on the
issue this year."
20. 49 U.S.C. § 1131, generally§ 1101-1155
(2000). The NTSB was originally created in 1966
under the Department of Transportation, where
it languished. The ind epe ndent NTSB as we
know it today was established by the Independent
Safety Board Act of 1974.

road, or major marine accidents and
to issue reports and reform recommendations to the Secretary of
Transportation. 20 It has five members, appointed by the president,
with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and, most importantly, it operates independently from the Federal Aviation Administration.
Prior to the establishment of the NTSB, air
traffic safety regulations
were left to the FAA.
Watchdogs complained
that the FAA suffered
under its so-called "dual
mandate," to simultaneously promote a ir
commerce and air
safety, and the NTSB was
established to take over
safety investigations and
relieve the FAA of this
conflict of interest.
At its own discretion, the NTSB
forms a "special board of inquiry" following "an accident involv[ing] a
substantial question about public
safety." Investigators are selected by
the NTSB Board; other interested
parties may petition to be included,
at the comp lete discretion of the
Board, in the investigation. NTSB investigators have broad powers to conduct thorough investigations. Indeed , according to its enabling
legislation , the NTSB may "do anything necessary to conduct an investigation." The investigating committee
may issue subpoenas and compel
sworn testimony; order autopsies and
other forensic tests "when necessary

21. Carlisle, Comment: The FAA v. the NTSB: Now
that Congress has Addressed the Federal Aviation
Administration's "Dual Mandate," has the FAA Begun Living Up to Its Amended Purpose of Making Air
Travel Safer, or is the National Transportation Safety
Board Still Doing Its job Alone? 66 J. AIR L. & COM.
741, 757 (2001).
22. The Rand Institute for Civil Justice, Personnel and Parties in NTSB Aviation Accident Investigations, pg. xiii., at http://www.rand.ori::/ publications/MR/MRI 12.1 /M RI 12. I / pdf.
23. Id. at pg. xxv. It should also be observed
that some comm entators are concerned that recent case law, mandating deference to FAA interpretations of laws and regulations, has begun to
undermine the latitude of NTSB investigations
and the ability of the NTSB to effect regulatory
changes from the FAA. See, Singer, Garvey v. National Transportation Safety Board: The FAA Gets
its Cake and Eats it Too, 66 J. A.JR L. & COMM. 875
(2001).

to investigate an accident;" and may
bring a civil action in federal court
against any party that obstructs its investigation. Although the NTSB does
not have the right to guarantee the
confidentiality of witness statements,
interviewees do have the right to
have counsel or a non-legal representative present during the interview

The NTSB may 11 do
anything necessary
to conduct an
investigation."

and the right to have any party, besides the actual interviewer, excluded
from the interview.
Upon completion of an investigation, the NTSB delivers a report consisting of two parts to the Secretary of
Transportation: a factual record containing all of the witness statements,
factual observations, and discoveries
made by the investigators; and a set
of reform recommendations. The
secretary is required by statute to give
a "formal written response to each
[NTSB] recommendation," within 90
days of receiving an NTSB report.
The secretary must state publicly
whether the reform recommendations will be adopted in whole, in
part, or not at all.
The findings and recommendations of the NTSB cannot be used as a
basis for civil or criminal liability, although the factual record it creates
can obviously be marshaled as evidence in such proceedings. 21 In civil
trials, NTSB investigators cannot be
called on to testify, although parties
may depose such investigators once,
and use that deposition at trial. During their deposition, investigators are
allowed to reference their notes and
the factual record . The factual report
is also admissible at trial as a public
document exception to the hearsay
September-October 2002

rule. As for criminal trials, investigators may testify without restrictions in
state or local grand jury hearings or
criminal proceedings.
The NTSB has been criticized as
powerless to implement its own recommendations, but this weakness is
really a source of strength and independence. Since it doesn't have to
concern itself with anything except safety, the
NTSB is not hamstrung
by cost or political worries; it can afford, year after year, to repeat findings that make the FAA,
the airline industry, and
the federal government
uncomfortable. A recent
study by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice concurs in this assessment,
describing the NTSB as
an agency that "enjoys
the reputation of being the most independent safety investigative authority in the world."22
The Rand study notes that although the NTSB is not a regulatory
agency and its charge to make recommendations regarding airline safety
does not carry with it enforcement
authority, the fact that commercial
air travel has become accessible for
millions increases the intensity of
media and public scrutiny of major
airline accidents, thereby enhancing
the persuasive power ofNTSB investigations and recommendations.
Given these circumstances, an NTSB
statement of cause may not legally
bind the FAA to implement changes,
but it certainly can bring about calls
for change that "publicly" bind the
FAA to adhere to NTSB recommendations.23

Essential elements
The NTSB example, accordingly,
helps underscore what elements are
essential in any proposal to form viable innocence commissions and
suggests ways to modify some features of the Canadian Public Inquiry
model:
( 1) Innocence commissions should be
standing committees chartered to investigate, at their own discretion, any wrongVolume 86, Number 2 Judicature
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Jul conviction24 and to recommend any
public policy reforms they deem necessary.
One problem with the Canadian
Public Inquiry model is that its investigations must be triggered by a direction from the executive branch.
Aside from the danger that the executive branch simply won't charter
investigations it doesn't like, this approach also runs the risk that review
of officially acknowledged wrongful
convictions only occur as a response
to public pressure. Hopefully, the opposite dynamic will be in play. By routinely examining wrongful convictions, including cases that are not
"high profile," innocence commissions will be able to bring serious
scrutiny and public attention to serious problems and misconduct that
would have otherwise been ignored
and forgotten;
(2) Innocence commissions need the
power to order reasonable and necessary
investigative services, including forensic
testing, autopsies, and other research services.
It seems wise to keep the permanent innocence commission bureaucracy as small as possible, expanding
on a contractual basis when a case
demands it. Usually existing agencies, such as state or local crime laboratories, could provide adequate forensic services. In fact, this is the
approach taken by the Morin and
Sophonow Canadian Public Inquiries, who sent the forensic evidence
pertaining to the case to provincial
laboratories. And while the Morin inquiry cost the province around $3
million, most of these costs were associated with the cost of providing every intervenor with their own counsel in addition to the investigative
resources expenses accrued. It is conceivable that an effective innocence
commission could operate on a far
smaller budget. For example, a
commission's initial inability to create civil or criminal liability to any of
the participating parties may cut
down on attorney's fees.
On the other hand, innocence
commissions should not be stymied
in their investigations by arbitrary
budget cuts from the executive, the
legislature, or even the administra-

tive office of the judiciary. One solu.:
tion might be arbitration or court review of disputes over requests for investigative resources;
(3) Innocence commissions must have
the power to sub-poena documents, compel
testimony, and bring civil actions against
any person or entity that obstructs its investigations.
Such powers are simply indispensable. Without the ability to lift up flat
rocks and see what's underneath, innocence commissions will revert to
being weak, ineffectual "study"
groups that can be disregarded with
impunity by those who most need exposure. The incredible and indispensable revelatory power of depositions is exemplified by the "Ford
Heights Four" case. 25 In 1978, three
men and one woman were convicted
of the abduction and murder of one
woman and the murder and rape of
another. The men were primarily
convicted based on a tip from a man
claiming to have seen them near the
murder scene and the testimony of a
co-defendant who was forced to confess to the crime and then offered a
reduced sentence if she agreed totestify against her co-defendants. The
convictions of all four were overturned in 1999 based on DNA testing
that excluded them as the perpetrators. Only during depositions taken
in preparation for the exonerees civil
suit against Cook County was it revealed that the convictions rested on
evidence and information never
turned over to the defense, due to
police and prosecutorial misconduct.
It is clear from this egregious example that depositions are a necessary mechanism for any procedure
dedicated to identifying the causes
leading to wrongful convictions.
(4) The findings and recommendations
of innocence commissions should not be
binding in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding, although the factual
record created uy the commission can be
made available to the public.
Like the NTSB, this feature of an
innocence commission will ultimately prove to be a source of
strength, not weakness, a way to preserve independence and insulate the
commission from political pressures.
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Nor will it unfairly restrict civil or
criminal cases.
As a practical matter, federal civil
rights litigation for victims of wrongful convictions are very difficult and
often prohibitively expensive undertakings. Prosecutors have absolute
immunity from civil lawsuits for any
actions they take while engaged in
litigating a criminal case, even if it includes unlawful, even criminal suppression of exculpatory evidence,
and qualified immunity (good faith is
a defense) for their investigative activities. 26 Police officers have qualified immunity for their conduct outside the courtroom, and absolute
immunity for in court testimony. 27
The legal issue of qualified immunity can be the subject of interlocutory appeal, thereby greatly protracting the time and expense civil rights
plaintiffs must expend during litigation.28 And quite frequently, the lawsuits would have to be filed against
law enforcement officials with great
power in the community. Lawyers
are extremely reluctant to take on
such matters unless a "slam dunk"
constitutional violation is apparent
from the record. It is highly unlikely
24. A wrongful conviction should be carefully
defined. Ordinarily, it should embrace just those
cases where a conviction has been vacated based,
in part, on new evidence of innocence, and the
indictment was subsequently dismissed, the defendant was acquitted, or the governor issued a
pard o n. The inno ce n ce commission should,
however, have discretion to reach tougher cases,
such as instances where new evidence of innocence leads to a conviction being vacated and a
deal is struck p erm itting an Alford or nolo
contendre plea to time served. Such arrangements
are often impossible for an innocent defendant
to turn down and invite abuse, especially if law
enforcemen t officials insist on such an arrangement in order to avoid an innocence commission
inquiry.
25. For a more detailed report, see Protess and
Warden, A Promise of justice, at: h!.m.fl
www.law.northwestern .edu/depts /clinic/wrongful /rea dings /wa rd en protess/TOC . htm.
Lawrence Marshall and Thomas Sullivan also discuss this case in articles in this issue, see Do exonerations prove that "the system works? (page 83) and
Preventing wrongful convictions (page 106).
26. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 11 3 S.
Ct. 2606, 125 L. Ed.2d 209 (1993); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 , 96 S. Ct. 984, 47 L. Ed.2d
128 (1976).
27. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S. Ct.
2151, 150 L. Ed.2d 272 (2001) (qualified immunity); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S. Ct.
1108, 75 L. Ed.2d 96 (1983) (absolute testimonial immunity) ; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818, 102 S. Ct. 2727 , 73 L. Ed.2d 396 (1982)
(qualified immunity).
28. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 4 72 U.S. 511, 524-530,
105 S. Ct. 2806, 86 L. Ed.2d 411 (1985).

that an innocence commission investigation will get in the way of a
plaintiff seeking civil relief; if anything, revelations from an innocence commission investigation
might provide the stimulation lawyers need to pursue meritorious but
costly lawsuits.
Similarly, criminal prosecutions
arising out of law enforcement misconduct
in wrongful conviction
cases are very rare, and
generally arise only
when evidence is overwhelming or public
pressure compels a serious investigation. It's
hard to imagine innocence commission investigations unduly hampering
criminal
prosecutions;
(5) Innocence commissions shou/,d be transparent, publicly accountab/,e bodies, composed of diverse, respected members of the criminal justice
community and the public.
A major reason for the creation of
innocence commissions is to bolster
public confidence in the fairness of
the criminal justice system. It goes
without saying that its members must
command respect, represent all sides
of the criminal justice system, and reflect the diversity of the public it
serves. Nor would the goal of enhancing public confidence be well served
if innocence commissions operate
with the secrecy of a grand jury, or if
they conduct public hearings that are
designed more for drama than gathering useful information.
A balance needs to be stuck. There
are plain advantages to the Canadian
Public Inquiry method; it permits interested parties to call and cross-examine witnesses and it uses liberal
rules of evidence. On the other
hand, innocence commissions must
be careful not to drag out their inquiries; they need clear authority to
exercise sensible control over the
length and breadth of their proceed-

29. Letter to Massachusetts Governor Alvin
Fuller from Edwin Borchard, dated April 21,
1927. Borchard Papers, Yale University Archives.

ings. In terms of transparency, it
should be noted that the CCRC's annual reports, website, and disclosure
of budgetary information stands as
an excellent template; and
(6) Innocence commissions should be
required to fi/,e public reports on their findings and recommendations, and the relevant branch ofgovernment to which these

A capstone reform
Innocence commissions should be
seen as a capstone reform because
they have the capacity, through the
recurring perusal of wrongful convictions, to provide a consistent, powerful impetus to remedy systemic defects that bring about wrongful
convictions. While criminal justice
politics will inevitably
swing between "liberal"
and "conservative" eras,
the fundamental desire
of citizens to make sure
the system can reliably
determine who is guilty
and who is innocent
should remain constant.
That is why anchoring innocence commissions to
actual cases where there
have been undeniable
miscarriages of justice is
a sound long-term strategy.
It is encouraging to see leaders in
the judiciary, the legislature, and the
executive branches of government
and members of the academy propose different kinds of innocence
commissions. Soon, however, the
process of experimentation must begin in the laboratory of the states; inventive judges, legislators, and governors should act before the "learning
moment" occasioned by the exoneration of so many innocents begins to
wane.
In 1927, Yale professor Edward
Borchard, perhaps the father of modern "innocence" scholarship, made a
memorable plea to Governor Lowell
Fuller for a commission to investigate
the convictions of Sacco and Vanzetti.
"I write to you," Borchard stressed, "not
as a radical sympathizer with the convicted men, but as a person interested
in the preservation of our legal institutions. This depends on earning and retaining the respect of the public for
those institutions. In a democracy, the
confidence of the public in the fair and
unbiased administration of justice lies
close the roots of orderly government. "29 We couldn't agree more. i 1i

Innocence commissions
should be seen as a
capstone reform.

reports are submitted shou/,d issue a formal written response to the recommendations within a fixed period of time.
As noted at the outset, state criminal justice systems are sufficiently diverse in structure that one could anticipate innocence commissions to
be created by the legislature, the executive, or the judiciary branches. In
theory, it does not matter how such
entities are formed as long as appropriate organizing principles are followed that permit the commissions
independence and genuine capacity
to investigate and make meaningful
recommendations. As demonstrated
by the NTSB, from whose charter this
proposed element is drawn, the success of an innocence commission will
not necessarily turn on whether its
recommendations are immediately
adopted. Ultimately, what matters
most is that the findings and recommendations are clearly elucidated
and made transparent to the public,
and the relevant branch or branches
of government to whom they are reported respond in writing within a
fixed period of time. Such a procedure ensures that innocence commissions will over time become an increasingly valuable, independent
public force for remedying the
causes of wrongful convictions.
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